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TRADEMARK CONFRONTS FREE SPEECH ON THE
INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY: "CYBERGRIPERS"
FACE A CONSTITUTIONAL COLLISION
I. INTRODUCTION
As the world of Internet technology evolves, new legal issues seem to
increase exponentially. In one area of cyberlaw, intellectual property rights
collide with freedom of speech. This protest model, also known as "cyber-
griping," occurs when a consumer creates a web page on the Internet to
voice an opinion (usually a negative one) about a particular product,
company, or service.' The recent trend involves the targeted company
retaliating against the owner of the website or domain name by asserting its
trademark rights.2 However, while mark owners have the right to
vigorously protect their trademarks, they may not do so at the expense of
the First Amendment.3
Many "cybersquatters 4 wrongfully assert a First Amendment defense
to justify their own commercial gain in domain name disputes.5 However,
1. Cybergriping makes it easy and accessible for unhappy consumers to openly criticize
companies and corporations in front of thousands of people. See Oscar S. Cisneros, Note, Bally
Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229 (2000); see also Thomas E.
Anderson, Emerging Intellectual Property Issues in Cyberspace, 78 MICH. B.J. 1260 (Nov.
1999). "Cybergripers are defaming business giants." Id. at 1260. These usually include
extensions of a company's trademark, such as www.lucentsucks.com and
www.walmartpuertoricosucks.com. See Gwendolyn Mariano & Evan Hansen, Parody Sites
Sucked into Cybersquatting Squabbles, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 24, 2000, at
http://news.cnet.com/news/0- 1 005-200-2604599.html (hereinafter Parody Sites].
2. See discussion infra Part III.
3. See discussion infra Part III.D.
4. Robert L. Tucker, Information Superhighway Robbery: The Tortious Misuse of Links,
Frames, Metatags, and Domain Names, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 92 (Fall 1999), at
http://www.vjolt.net/vol4/v4i2a8-tucker.html.
Individuals who attempt to profit by reserving domain names composed of
someone else's registered marks and later reselling or licensing those domain
names back to the rightful owner of the mark are called "cybersquatters."
Cybersquatters intentionally register domain names based on others' trademarks for
the purpose of selling or canceling them in exchange for large sums of money.
Id.
5. See Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634 (E.D. Penn. 2000).
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legitimate cybergripers typically find themselves caught in the crossfire.6
Consider the following hypothetical: Complacent Customer purchases
a widget from the Corporate Giant, Widgets, Inc. Complacent Customer
then takes the product home, only to find the widget defective. After
numerous telephone calls and letters, Corporate Giant still does not
respond. Complacent Customer then becomes Disgruntled Customer.
Furious, he launches his first cybergripe in the form of the website
"www.widgetsincsucks.com." Before he knows it, his simple protest site
attracts thousands of hits from others who share similar experiences with
Widgets, Inc. Members of the public post complaints on the message
boards. Further, disgruntled ex-employees of Corporate Giant post their
individual stories. Pretty soon widgetsincsucks.com attracts the attention
of Corporate Giant. It sends Disgruntled Customer a cease-and-desist
letter. Disgruntled Customer, after touting his First Amendment rights,
proudly posts the letter on the website, causing even more negative
publicity for the Corporate Giant.7
According to the Corporate Giant's point of view, it does not matter
whether Widgets, Inc. wins its case by asserting trademark infringement
under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act8 or whether
Disgruntled Customer wins based on his First Amendment 9 right of free
speech.' 0 Upon learning a valuable lesson in the world of cyberspace,
Widgets, Inc. must now hire a team of Internet savvy lawyers to constantly
monitor the web, searching for potential infringers. 1 It also acts to prevent
others like Disgruntled Customer from creating their own sites.1 2 In a form
of reverse cybersquatting, it preemptively registers domain names such as
www.widgetsincsucks.net, www.widgetsincsucks.org, and
www.widgetsincreallysucks.com. 13  With ICANN' S14 recent talk of
6. See Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166 (C.D. Cal.
1998).
7. See Robert Trigaux, gripe.com, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 31, 1999, at 1H.
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (making a person civilly liable for bad
faith use of a mark that is identical or confusingly similar to the protected mark of another).
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. See id.
11. For example, Cyveillance is a company created to monitor online trademark abuse for
clients. Trigaux, supra note 7, at 1H.
12. See Wendy R. Leibowitz, Lawyers and Technology: Fighting Cyber-Libel War, NAT'L
L.J., July 19, 1999, at A20. Many law firms are developing "cyberpatrols" to protect Internet
intellectual property. Id.
13. See id. In a preemptive strike, Bell Atlantic reserved the domain name,
www.bellatlanticsucks.com, to keep protesters from using the name. Id.
14. ICANN is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, a non-profit,
"quasi-governmental" agency that manages the domain name system on the Internet. John Hartje,
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expanding the top-level domain system, 15 the Corporate Giant has a choice:
spend millions on this preemptive strike or grin and bear it.
16
In the evolving world of cybersquatting, scenarios like the above
hypothetical appear frequently. For example, Richard L. Hatch, a toy
collector from Bangor, Maine, created www.walmartsucks.com after
Bangor stores banned him from buying toys in bulk.17  Scott Harrison
launched www.chasebanksucks.com after Chase Manhattan Bank
erroneously billed his credit card.' 8 Andrew Faber launched a "Bally
Sucks" website after Bally's Total Fitness reneged on a deal to give him a
lower rate and more privileges in return for a year's membership. 19 John
Osborne rented a U-Haul truck in 1997.20 After repeated breakdowns, and
after U-Haul insisted Osborne pay for damage to the truck, Osborne
launched the site, "U-Hell, Misadventures in Moving.'
However, cybergripers do not fall into the traditional definition of
22 2cybersquatters, especially where First Amendment rights are concerned.23
Furthermore, even though ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy 24 ("UDRP") closely mirrors the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA") enacted in 1999,25 domain names that
Resolving Internet Domain Name Disputes, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Aug. 2000, at 38. "ICANN
approves the registrars who distribute the domain names and who maintain the databases of the
names which are assigned and to whom. To date, ICANN has accredited 50 currently-operational
registrars." Id.
15. See TLD Application Process: Information for Applicants, at http://www.icann.org/
tlds/tld-application-process.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2000) [hereinafter TLD Application
Process].
16. See Leibowitz, supra note 12, at A20.
17. Trigaux, supra note 7, at 1H. The site had 1,054,072 hits as of Sept. 7, 2000. See
http://www.walmartsucks.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2000).
18. David Segal & Caroline E. Mayer, Sites for Sore Consumers: Complaints About
Companies Multiply on the Web, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1999, at Al [hereinafter Sites for Sore
Consumers].
19. Bally's Total Fitness Sued a Long Beach Man Who Put Up a Web Site Called "Bally's
Sucks, " CITY NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 24, 1998, LEXIS, News Group File, All.
20. Trigaux, supra note 7, at 1H.
21. Id.
22. See Tucker, supra note 4, 92 (defining and explaining the term cybersquatter).
23. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Corp. of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). "[T]rademark infringement law does not curtail or prohibit the exercise of the
First Amendment right to free speech." Id. at *35.
24. See Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/
udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (approved on Oct. 24, 1999) [hereinafter UDRP].
25. President Clinton signed the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus
Reform Act of 1999 into law. Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3002 (1999). The ACPA permits a court to
order a domain name registrant "to transfer, forfeit or cancel its domain name if the trademark
owner shows that the domain name registrant registered, trafficked in or used the trademark
2001]
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use a protected trademark to protest a particular company or product are
increasingly losing domain name disputes.2 6
Using the "www. [protected mark]sucks.com" model, this Comment
argues that neither the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act nor
ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy should
prevent a legitimate cybergriper from using a trademark in a domain name
to protest a particular company or product. Part II compares and contrasts
the history of both the ACPA and ICANN's dispute resolution policy with
special focus on the bad faith factors balanced against First Amendment
rights. Part III provides a thorough analysis of both frameworks as applied
to actual domain name disputes, concentrating on the fair use defense and
ICANN anomalies. Part IV compares and contrasts both systems in terms
of public policy and international considerations and, finally, Part V
concludes with potential solutions in light of new legal developments.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
2 7
1. Evolution of the Lanham Act2
8
Trademark protection generally furthers three interests: "[P]rotecting
consumers from being deceived and misled, curbing the unjust enrichment
of poachers who infringe on the marks of others, and protecting the
investment made by the mark owner in developing the mark and the
subsequent goodwill of consumers toward it.' '29 The Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA")3 ° went into effect on November 29,
1999, amending Section 43 of the Lanham Act.3 1 Prior to the ACPA,
owner's distinctive or famous mark (or a mark that is confusingly similar) with a bad faith intent
to profit from the mark." Hartje, supra note 14, at 39; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Supp. V
1999).
26. Parody Sites, supra note 1. "ICANN's dispute procedures have tended to favor parties
that challenge domain name registrations, which are usually corporations." Id.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Supp. V 1999).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
29. Cisneros, supra note 1, at 230 n.3 (citing Michael G. Frey, Comment, Is it Fair to
Confuse? An Examination of Trademark Protection, the Fair Use Defense and the First
Amendment, 65 U. C1N. L. REv. 1255, 1260 (1997)).
30. The ACPA is also known as the Trademark Cyberpiracy Prevention Act. Christopher
Null, Name Grab, PC/CoMPUTiNG, Apr. 1, 2000, at 40.
31. Shannon P. Duffy, Federal Judge Grants Injunction to Shut Down Cybersquatter's
Sites, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 23, 2000, at 16.
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trademark owners relied heavily on Lanham Act provisions to resolve
trademark disputes,32  specifically focusing on the Lanham Act's
requirements that the mark be famous and that another party use the mark
commercially.33 These requirements became more difficult to meet in the
realm of cybersquatting, especially where the public did not know the mark
well enough to consider it famous, or where the cybersquatter simply
registered the name without any commercial use.34 Furthermore, trademark
owners only succeeded under the Lanham Act at the expense of costly
litigation. 35 As the peculiarities of cybersquatting issues led to uncertain
application of the Lanham Act, Congress passed the ACPA to remedy this
problem.36
2. The Underlying Purpose of the ACPA
U.S. District Judge Stewart Dalzell explored the purpose of the ACPA
in Shields v. Zuccarini.37 He found that the ACPA's purpose was to shield
the consumer and protect American business while promoting the
expansion of e-commerce.38 Furthermore, Judge Dalzell found that the
ACPA had an additional purpose of clarifying the law for trademark
owners by explicitly prohibiting "the bad-faith and abusive registration [of
protected marks]," commonly known as cybersquatting.
3 9
While the Senate Judiciary Committee focused on the difficulty of
cybersquatter identification,4° the main concern of the House was potential
32. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127; see also Robert Kain & J. Rodman Steele, Commercial
Defamation and Trade Disparagement under Federal Law-The Newly Expanded Scope of
§43(a) of the Lanham Act, at http://www.rckain.com/lanham.htm (1989) (explaining how the
Lanham Act amended the Trademark Act in 1946 to include causes of action for dilution in
addition to infringement). Prior to the Lanham Act, issues of "commercial defamation" and
"trade disparagement" were controlled by state common law. Id. Federal law currently protects
trademarks. Trademark Law: An Overview, at http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/trademark.html
(last visited Oct. 22, 2001).
33. Edward T. Dartley, Pulling the Plug on Cybersquatters, 161 N.J. L.J. 270, 270 (2000).
"Trademark infringement requires likelihood of consumer confusion in light of the closeness of
the relationship between the respective parties' goods or services." Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. Additionally, "some trademark owners simply chose to pay exorbitant amounts to
purchase the domain name from the cybersquatter rather than endure the substantial costs and
delays of trademark litigation." Id.
36. Id.
37. 89 F. Supp. 2d 634 (E.D. Penn. 2000).
38. Duffy, supra note 31, at 16 (interpreting Judge Dalzell's opinion in Shields v.
Zuccarini).
39. Id.
40. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 530 (E.D. Va. 2000). "A
significant problem faced by trademark owners in the fight against cybersquatting is the fact that
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damage to businesses.4 1 The cybersquatter's registration of a particular
mark as a domain name not only prevents the trademark owner from using
that particular mark in its own domain name, but customers of the
trademark owner are diverted to the cybersquatter's website, causing the
trademark owner to lose business.42 In addition, the cybersquatter may
"blur the distinctive quality of the mark," or tarnish the mark when linking
to questionable websites, such as pornography.43 Finally, if a business does
not actively police its trademark to prohibit unauthorized use, it risks losing
all of its rights by letting the trademark fall into the public domain. 44 Thus,
Congress created the ACPA in a landmark attempt to "address a growing
problem in an increasingly Internet-based business world. ' 45
3. Current Applications of the ACPA
The ACPA disregards the Lanham Act's requirements of fame and
commercial use,46 and includes "distinctive marks" as well. 47 Further, the
ACPA replaces the commercial use requirement with the confusingly
similar standard.48 Thus, so long as the mark and the domain name are
confusingly similar, the ACPA applies regardless of the goods or services
of the parties.49 The ACPA provides that
[A] person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a
mark... if, without regard to the goods or services of the
parties, that person-
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark...
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that-
many cybersquatters register domain names under aliases or otherwise provide false information
in their registration applications in order to avoid identification and service of process by the
mark owner." Id.
41. Id. at 530 n.1; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 6(1999).
42. Lucent, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 530 n.1.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Michael A. Gollin, Seven Important Changes Enacted in the Intellectual Property and
Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, June 2000, at 30.
Under the new law, a trademark owner may now seek relief from someone who,
with bad faith intent, registers, traffics in, or uses an Internet domain name that is
identical or confusingly similar to the trademark. The statute allows a trademark
owner to sue a domain name itself (in rem), if the cyberpirate is insulated from
legal process. It also provides for statutory damages of up to $100,000.
Id.
46. Dartley, supra note 33, at 270.
47. Id. at 271.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time
of registration of the domain name, is identical or
confusingly similar to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the
time of registration of the domain name, is identical
or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark; or
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by
reason of section 706 of title 18....
Therefore, in contrast to a traditional trademark infringement claim
where the owner of the trademark must demonstrate consumer confusion
based upon commercial goods and services, an ACPA claim only needs to
demonstrate that the mark and the domain name are similar.5' In addition,
the ACPA broadens the application of the law to cybersquatting in
general.52 It applies not only to a person who registers or traffics in a
domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to a protected mark,
but also to an individual who merely uses a domain name that is identical
or confusingly similar to a protected mark.53
4. The ACPA's Bad Faith Requirement
Although the ACPA does not offer a definition of the term "bad
faith, 54 the Act delineates nine factors that a court may consider.55 These
factors include: 1) the domain name's genuine noncommercial or fair use
of the mark;56 2) the intent of the person to divert customers from the
trademark holder's site to another site for commercial gain, to tarnish the
trademark, or to create a likelihood of confusion surrounding the source of
the site; 57 3) "the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the
domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain; '58 4)
and a person's continuing pattern of hoarding multiple domain names that
the person knows are identical, are confusingly similar,59 or are
"dilutive ... marks of others that are famous at the time of registration of
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
51. Dartley, supra note 33, at 271.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Gollin, supra note 45, at 30; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Supp. V 1999).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1999).
56. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV).
57. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V).
58. Id. §I 125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI). Additionally, a person's "prior conduct indicating a pattern
of such conduct" offers evidence of bad faith under this section. Id.
59. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII).
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such domain names, without regard to the goods or services of the
parties.
' 60
These factors are non-exclusive and courts do not have to take any of
them into consideration. 6' However, a person with a legitimate belief that
the use of the domain name is lawful62 may have a "fair use" defense to the
ACPA's bad faith requirement..63 It applies when the defendant, in good
faith, uses the plaintiffs mark for descriptive purposes only, and not as a
trademark.64 The defense differs from the broad fair use exception of
copyright law,65 which states that uses such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research may be fair.66 Trademark law
forbids the use of a protected mark that is "likely to cause confusion, or to
cause a mistake, or to deceive., 67 Therefore, courts will not hold a domain
name registrant liable when the registrant reasonably believed the use of
the name was proper, even if the registrant's actions otherwise constitute
bad faith under the statute.68
5. First Amendment Implications in Trademark Law
First Amendment concerns, applied within the context of "fair use" of
a registered trademark, may limit trademark rights.69 In congressional
hearings involving the dilution prohibition of the Lanham Act, 70 Senator
Orrin Hatch asserted that the statute "will not prohibit... parody, satire,
editorial and other forms of expression that are not a part of a commercial
transaction., 71  The Lanham Act's fair use defense applies to individuals
60. Id.
61. Dartley, supra note 33, at 271.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 1999).
63. See Cisneros, supra note 1, at 232.
64. Id.
65. Jon H. Oram, Will the Real Candidate Please Stand Up?: Political Parody on the
Internet, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 467, 492-93 (1998).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The fairness of the use depends on factors including:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id.
67. Oram, supra note 65, at 492-93.
68. Dartley, supra note 33, at 271-72.
69. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(citing L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987)).
70. 141 CONG. REc. S19, 306-10 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
71. Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1167 (citing 141 CONG. REC. S19, 310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995)
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using a trademark in good faith and for descriptive purposes only.72 If the
defendant uses the plaintiff's mark as a trademark to "describe the goods or
services of the defendant or their geographic origin," then the fair use
defense does not apply.73
For example, the court in Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v.
Faber74 held that the First Amendment protected the defendant's speech
because the defendant used the mark in the context of a consumer
commentary.75 However, while courts recognize that the Internet warrants
special protection as a place of public discourse,7 6 there is no clear legal
precedent involving free speech and trademark protection.77 Furthermore,
in an attempt to regulate improper Internet behavior, judicial fora may
broadly interpret the law in a way that threatens First Amendment
protection of protest and parody sites.78
B. ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
1. History of ICANN's Dispute Resolution Policy
"ICANN is envisioned as a model for the quasi-government of the
Internet because it is ostensibly responsible only to 'the Internet
community.' 79 ICANN is a nonprofit corporation created to assume the
responsibility for domain name management from Network Solutions, Inc.
("NSI").80  Previously, NSI was the only entity responsible for assigning
domain names in the United States.81  NSI only dealt with top-level
(statement of Sen. Hatch)).
72. Cisneros, supra note 1, at 232.
73. Id.
74. 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1161.
75. Id. at 1167.
76. Tucker, supra note 4, 18.
77. Rebecca Quick, Try http:/www.thejoke'sonyou.com, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 30, 1997,
at 5.
78. Oram, supra note 65, at 475. "Traditionally, courts have afforded parody substantial
First Amendment protection, often times [sic] providing humorists with virtual immunity against
claims of intellectual property infringement and defamation." Id. at 474-75. When judges apply
existing precedents from traditional media to the Internet, the end result is a "manipulation of
legal doctrine." Id. at 475.
79. Jonathan GS Koppell, New World Order, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Aug. 28, 2000, at 51.
80. Id. NSI is a private company that held a contract first with the National Science
Foundation, a government agency, and later with the U.S. Commerce Department. Id.
81. Anderson, supra note I, at 1261. See generally Luke A. Walker, Note, ICANN's
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 289 (2000) (discussing
the transition between NSI and ICANN, in addition to ICANN's origins).
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domains ("gTLDs") such as ".com," '.net," '.org," and ".gov," similar to
ICANN's current jurisdiction. 82  NSI's dispute resolution procedure
allowed a trademark owner to prevent another's use of a domain name that
was identical to the trademark owner's registered mark.83 Neither party
could use the name unless they reached an agreement.84  The registrant
often forced the trademark owner to bring an infringement action by
refusing to transfer the domain name.85
The UDRP is a fast and inexpensive administrative proceeding that
provides a more efficient option for obtaining a domain name from a
cybersquatter than resorting to the court system.86 The administrative panel
consists of one to three members who decide the dispute under the
UDRP.87 ICANN utilizes four separate organizations to adjudicate domain
name disputes: the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), the
National Arbitration Forum ("NAF"), Disputes.org/eResolution
Consortium ("eResolution"), and the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution
("CPR").88  Although there are some procedural differences, each
organization adheres to ICANN's rules. 89 This ensures consistent results.90
2. Current Applications of the UDRP
The mandatory administrative proceeding of the UDRP does not
apply to all disputes. 9' Rather, the UDRP, approved by ICANN on October
24, 1999,92 applies only when the complainant, a third party, can prove:
(i) [the registrant's] domain name is identical or confusingly
similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant
has rights; and
(ii) [the registrant has] no rights or legitimate interests in respect
of the domain name; and
(iii) [the registrant's] domain name has been registered and is
82. Anderson, supra note 1, at 1261.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Matt Railo, Entertaining New Options in the Fight Against Cybersquatters: Choosing
Between Internet Administrative Proceedings and Federal Court Lawsuits, ENT. L. REP., June
2000, at 4.
87. Id.
88. Hartje, supra note 14, at 38.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(a).
92. UDRP, supra note 24.
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being used in bad faith.93
All three of the above elements must be present to initiate an arbitration
proceeding.94  Once the parties begin arbitration, ICANN refuses to
participate in the process any further. 95 ICANN's involvement ends once
the complainant selects the "Provider" from the approved list of arbitration
organizations.96
3. The UDRP's Bad Faith Requirement
ICANN's list of bad faith factors is strikingly similar to that of the
ACPA.97 Evidence of bad faith includes circumstances indicating that the
registrant obtained the domain name in order to transfer it to the trademark
owner or competitor of the trademark owner "for valuable consideration;
' 'g
that the registrant registered the domain name to keep the trademark owner
from using it99 (but only if the registrant engaged in "a pattern of such
conduct"); 00 or that the registrant "registered the domain name primarily
for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor."' 0' 1 Finally,
circumstances indicating bad faith include the registrant's intentional
attempt
[T]o attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to [the
registrant's] web site or other on-line location, by creating a
likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the
source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of [the
registrant's] web site or location or of a product or service on
[the registrant's] web site or location.
10 2
Additionally, the UDRP has a "fair use" exception similar to that of
the ACPA.' °3 This exception applies when the registrant legitimately uses
the domain name "without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly
93. Id. § 4(a).
94. Jeffrey M. Gitchel, Cyberwars: Domain Name Dispute Policy Provides a New Hope to
Parties Confronting Cybersquatters, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Aug. 2000, at 34.
95. See UDRP, supra note 24, §§ 4(h), 5-6.
96. See id. § 4(d).
97. Compare UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(b), with 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. V
1999).
98. UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(b)(i).
99. Id. § 4(b)(ii).
100. Id.
101. Id. § 4(b)(iii).
102. Id. § 4(b)(iv).
103. See id. § 4(c)(iii).
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divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue."'1 4
C. Comparison of the UDRP and the ACPA
The UDRP and the ACPA were not only introduced at the same
time, 105 but they are also virtually identical. 10 6 However, while the UDRP
deals with domain names that are "identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights,"'1 7 the
ACPA deals with trademarks, 10 8 protected personal names, 10 9 and
distinctive" 0 and famous marks."' Although it seems that the UDRP only
applies to trade or service marks, in contrast to the ACPA's broader
applicability, the recent administrative panel decision of Winterson v.
Hogarth"12  expanded ICANN's policy. 13  The panel ruled that
"trademark... includes the rights of any thirdparty to his/her name."'
' 14
Furthermore, the bad faith requirement in the ACPA and the JDRP
are very similar."15 Both policies contain factors that balance in favor of
the respondent when the court or arbitration panel finds a bona fide
noncommercial or fair use,' 16 prior use in connection with a bona fide
offering of goods and services," 7 or when the respondent uses a name
under which the individual or company is commonly known (even if the
individual does not possess a trademark). 18  Both policies also contain
factors that weigh in favor of the complainant when the court or arbitration
panel finds that the respondent had an intent to divert customers from the
104. UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(c)(iii).
105. Compare UDRP, supra note 24, with 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
ICANN's policy was adopted on Aug. 26, 1999, and approved on Oct. 24, 1999. See UDRP,
supra note 24. The ACPA was approved on Nov. 29, 1999. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
106. Compare UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(a)(i) with 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Supp. V 1999).
107. UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(a)(i).
108. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
109. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
110. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I).
111. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
112. No. D2000-0235 (WIPO May 22, 2000), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-0235.html [hereinafter Winterson].
113. See id. § 6.20.
114. Id. (emphasis in original). "The Rules do not require that the Complainant's trademark
be registered by a government authority or agency for such a right to exist." Id. § 6.3 (emphasis
in original).
115. Compare UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(b)(ii), with 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. V
1999).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV); UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(c)(iii).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(d)(l)(B)(i)(III); UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(c)(i).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I-II); UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(c)(ii).
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complainant's site (either for financial gain, to disrupt a competitor's
business, or to tarnish the mark),1 19 the respondent had an intent to profit
from the complainant's mark,120 or the respondent had a prior history or
pattern of cybersquatting.121 Therefore, due to their similarities, the same
analysis applies to both policies. 1
22
III. ANALYSIS
This Part will compare the use of a trademark to protest in a "brick-
and-mortar ' 23 setting to the use of a trademark to protest with an Internet
domain name. The cases of Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v.
Spencer124 and Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Manny's Porshop
125
illustrate that a fine line exists between traditional cybersquatting and
protesting by using a protected mark in a domain name. However, these
cybersquatting issues do not apply to protest and parody websites.
126
Next, after dispensing with the bad faith factors that do not apply to
the "[protected mark]sucks.com" model, the analysis will explore the
applicable factors. This Part will begin with the pre-ACPA landmark case
of Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber,27 and will analyze the
evolution of the confusingly similar standard 128 as it first appeared in
Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com. 129  The "intent to divert
consumers"'130 factor is traced from Bally to the Panavision Int'l v.
Toeppen131 and Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen' 32 cases, where it is
distinguished.133 In addition, this Part will demonstrate that initial interest
confusion is inapplicable to the protest website model by distinguishing
"www. [protected mark]sucks.com" from the websites in Planned
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V); UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(b)(iv).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI); UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(b)(i).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII); UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(b)(ii).
122. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i); UDRP, supra note 24.
123. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1057
(9th Cir. 1999).
124. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7060 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2000).
125. 972 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
126. See discussion infra Part III.A.
127. 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
128. See discussion infra Part III.C. 1.
129. 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535 (E.D. Va. 2000).
130. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
131. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
132. 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
133. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
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Parenthood Federation ofAmerica v. Bucci'34 and Panavision.1
35
Finally, the analysis explores the issues of bona fide noncommercial
use and the First Amendment, 136 distinguishing between the external fair
use defense of the First Amendment and the internal fair use defense built
into the ACPA and discoverable through statutory construction.
137
Applying Planned Parenthood,138 Morrison & Foerster, LLP v. Wick,
139
and Shields v. Zuccarini,140 as distinguished from the protest website
model, the analysis concludes that the "www. [protected mark]sucks.com"
model constitutes speech protected by the First Amendment. 1
41
A. Traditional Cybersquatting Issues Do Not Apply to Protest and Parody
Sites
The first step in the analysis determines where the "www.[protected
mark]sucks.com" model fits into the existing legal framework. Generally,
there are three types of Internet domain name registration: cybersquatting,
good faith registration, and "cyberwarehousing."'' 42 Cybersquatting is "the
registration in bad faith of an Internet domain name that is identical or
confusingly similar to another's trademark or famous name."'
143
Cybersquatters register domain names based on the trademarks of others
with the intent of holding them for ransom by either "selling or canceling
them in exchange for large sums of money."' 144  The "good-faith
registrant,"'145 on the other hand, while lacking the intent to sell the domain
name,146 reserves it to actually conduct business under it, only to discover
later that the trademark belongs to someone else. 147 The "warehousing
134. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, *26-*28 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997).
135. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
136. See discussion infra Part III.D.
137. See discussion infra Part III.D. 1.
138. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338.
139. 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Colo. 2000).
140. 89 F. Supp. 2d 634.
141. See discussion infra Part II.D.2.
142. Marc E. Brown, Don't Pay Ransom to a Cybersquatter, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, July
2000, at 37.
143. Railo, supra note 86, at 4.
144. Tucker, supra note 4, 93; see also Panavision, 141 F.3d 1316. Dennis Toeppen is the
"undisputed king of 'cybersquatting."' Tucker, supra note 4, 93. "Toeppen has registered
approximately 240 Internet domain names without seeking permission from any entity that
previously used the names he registered." Id.
145. Brown, supra note 142, at 37.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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cybersquatter"'148 does not deliberately target trademark owners. 49 Seeing
domain names as a "real estate" opportunity, this person registers domain
names that have the potential for future consumer use. 150  Warehousing
cybersquatters do not violate the law.1
51
A fine line exists between the traditional cybersquatter and the
"warehousing cybersquatter."'' 52 In Spencer,15 3 for example, the defendant
registered the domain name "www.porschesource.com"'' 54 with the intent to
sell the domain name to a local Porsche dealership. 55 Under the ACPA's
nine bad faith factors, 156 the court ultimately found bad faith in the
defendant's "intent to profit from Porsche's mark."' 57  Furthermore, the
court based its analysis on the case of Manny's Porshop 58 In that case,
the court found that a Porsche repair shop called "Manny's Porshop"
diluted Porsche's trademark by establishing a "likelihood of confusion."'159
Thus, on both the Internet and in traditional "brick-and-mortar"'' 60 stores,
the trademark actions hinge on the protected mark's appearance in the
challenged domain name or store name. 161
This fine line between cyberwarehousing and cybersquatting presents
a special problem when applied to protest sites that use the format
"www.[protected mark]sucks.com."' 162  The "cybergriper,"' 163  while
arguably not a "good-faith registrant"' 64 in the traditional meaning of the
term, does not fit cleanly into either the bad-faith cybersquatter165 or the
"cyberwarehousing" category. 166  Like the bad-faith cybersquatter, this
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id. For example, "www.hotcars.com" used for a potential car sales company or
"www.greatskinnow.com" used for a skin care company. See id.
151. See Brown, supra note 142, at 37.
152. See id.
153. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7060.
154. Id. at *3.
155. Id. at *16-*17.
156. Id. at *14-*21.
157. Id. at *21.
158. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7060, at *13 (citing Manny's Porshop, 972 F. Supp. at 1132).
159. Manny's Porshop, 972 F. Supp. at 1132.
160. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1057
(9th Cir. 1999).
161. See Spencer, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7060; Manny's Porshop, 972 F. Supp. at 1128.
162. See Parody Sites, supra note 1.
163. See generally Trigaux, supra note 7.
164. Brown, supra note 142, at 37.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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registrant realizes that another person owns the trademark connected to the
registered domain name.' 67 However, like the "good-faith registrant," the
cybergriper intends to use the domain name for a bona fide noncommercial
purpose - namely to exercise a First Amendment right to either protest or
parody the trademark holder, or to provide a forum for consumer
criticism.
168
With the "www. [protected mark]sucks.com" domain names, the fine
lines drawn in the Porsche cyber-warehousing cases become even
fuzzier. 169 The court in Manny's Porshop found that mere inclusion of a
word similar to Porsche's trademark in the store's name was sufficient to
cause consumer confusion. 170  Using the ACPA, the court in Spencer
reached the same conclusion. 171 Under this logic, it would seem that a
registrant who registers a domain name consisting of a protected mark with
the word "sucks" tacked on to the end would be liable for trademark
dilution on the theories of consumer confusion and bad faith.172 However,
in comparing Manny 's Porshop to a scenario where a protester may paint a
brick-and-mortar storefront sign stating "[Protected Mark] Sucks," the First
Amendment would potentially offer protection for this type of protest
speech. 73 Thus, the remaining questions ask whether: 1) the likelihood of
confusion test applies to this type of registrant, and 2) which bad faith
requirements of both the ACPA and the UDRP apply to cybergripers. In
addition, it is necessary to determine whether the First Amendment offers a
complete defense to trademark dilution and, if not, to what extent the First
Amendment factors into the bad faith test as compared to trademark law in
general.
B. Non-Applicable Factors
At first glance, many of the bad faith factors in both the ACPA and
the UDRP do not apply to the protest/parody sites involving
"www.[protected mark]sucks.com.' 174  For example, a legitimate
167. See Trigaux, supra note 7.
168. Id.
169. See generally Spencer, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7060; Manny's Porshop, 972 F. Supp.
1128.
170. Manny's Porshop, 972 F. Supp. at 1131-32.
171. Spencer, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7060, at *12-*13.
172. See generally Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528 (E.D. Va.
2000).
173. See generally Brookfield, 174 F.3d 1036.
174. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1999); UDRP, supra note 24.
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cybergriper registers a domain name to protest, not to obtain a profit.
175
Further, the registrant is not offering bona fide goods or services.
176
Additionally, the registrant in this model does not have trademark or
intellectual property rights to the mark, nor does the cybergriper have a
prior pattern of cybersquatting conduct. 177 Therefore, the analysis turns on
three remaining factors: the confusingly similar standard, the respondent's
intent to divert consumers, and the bona fide non-commercial or fair use of
the mark.
1 78
C. Applicable Factors
1. The Confusingly Similar/Likelihood of Confusion Standard
Prior to the ACPA, trademark owners had to bring actions under
theories of either trademark infringement 179 or trademark dilution.' 80  The
difficulty the courts had in molding the Trademark Act into cyberpiracy
cases led to the evolution of the ACPA. 181 For example, in Bally, the court
applied the factors identified in AME Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats'82 (the
"Sleekcraft factors") to determine a likelihood of confusion.
83
These factors include a balance of the "strength of the mark;"'
' 84
"proximity of the goods;' ' 185 "similarity of the marks;" 186 "evidence of
actual confusion;' 187 "marketing channels used;"'' 88 "type of goods and the
degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser;"' 189 "defendant's
175. See Trigaux, supra note 7.
176. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(l)(B)(i)(III); see also UDRP, supra note 24.
177. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI), (VIII); see also UDRP, supra note 24. It is also
worthy of note that the threshold requirement of the mark being distinctive, famous, or a
registered trademark is automatically met here in favor of the complainant. See id. If the mark
were not well known, chances are the registrant would not have a reason to protest. Id.
178. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i); see also UDRP, supra note 24.
179. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994).
180. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
181. See generally Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161; Panavision, 141 F.3d 1316.
182. 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
183. "In determining whether a defendant's use of a plaintiffs trademarks creates a
likelihood of confusion, the courts apply an eight factor test ...." Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1163.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1163.
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intent in selecting the mark;"'190 and "likelihood of expansion of the product
lines." 91 While the court in Bally was forced to stretch its reasoning to fit
the facts of the case into these factors, 192 it ultimately found that "[n]o
reasonable consumer comparing Bally's official web site with Faber's site
would assume Faber's site 'to come from the same source, or thought to be
affiliated with, connected with, or sponsored by, the trademark owner."
93
Furthermore, even though the official domain name in Bally did not
contain the protected mark, the court ruled that even if the domain name
contained the mark, "'sucks' has entered the vernacular as a word loaded
with criticism,"' 94 therefore, "no reasonably prudent Internet user would
believe that 'Ballysucks.com' is the official Bally site or is sponsored by
Bally.', 195  The Bally court's analysis directly mirrors the identical or
confusingly similar standard set forth in the ACPA.
196
The ACPA's confusingly similar standard does not require any sort of
factor-balancing test.197 Rather, it is simply a threshold requirement.
198
Accordingly, if the domain name is not confusingly similar to the protected
mark, then the "claim... fails as a matter of law."'
199
On May 3, 2000, the court decided Lucent by applying the ACPA to a
protest website.200 Even though the court did not rule on the defendant's
argument that the plaintiffs rights were not violated as a matter of law,20'
the court noted that the defendant's argument did have merit.20 2 The court
found that parody, by its nature, makes confusion unlikely and suggests
lack of bad faith intent.20 3 This test is the key in determining whether the
defendant has infringed or diluted the trademark of the trademark holder.20 4
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 1164-66.
193. Id. at 1163-64.
194. Id. at 1164.
195. Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1165 n.2.
196. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1999).
197. See id.
198. See Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
199. Id.
200. Lucent, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 528-30.
201. Id. at 535.
202. Id. In dismissing the case on other grounds, the court stated that the "plaintiff
instituted this in rem action too hastily after mailing and e-mailing the notice of a proposed in rem
action to the registrant of lucentsucks.com." Id. at 536.
203. Lucent, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
204. Id. (citing Petro Shopping Ctrs., L.P. v. James River Petroleum, Inc., 130 F.3d 88, 91
(4th Cir. 1997)). "The Fourth Circuit has acknowledged that effective parody 'diminishes any
risk of consumer confusion,' and can therefore not give rise to a cause of action under the
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The court found "that the average consumer would not confuse
lucentsucks.com with a website sponsored by plaintiff., 20 5 Furthermore,
the court did not find evidence of bad faith.206 Citing the reasoning in
Bally,2°7 the court found that as long as the defendant could successfully
show that the website effectively parodied or criticized the plaintiffs
trademark, it would be near impossible for the plaintiff to succeed.208
2. Intent to Divert Consumers
In both the ACPA and the UDRP, an intent to divert customers from
the mark owner's site to the site under the registrant's domain name
indicates bad faith.209 Success under the ACPA requires the intent of the
registrant to result in potential damages, including harm to the mark's
goodwill as a result of "creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source,
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site. 210  It does not matter
whether the registrant intends to gain commercially or if the registrant
intends to "tarnish or disparage the mark., 21 1 Similarly, success under the
UDRP requires the registrant to have "registered the domain name
primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor,"212 or
[I]ntentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet
users to [the registrant's] web site or other on-line location, by
creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark
as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of [the
registrant's] web site or location or of a product or service on
[the registrant's] web site or location.213
The UDRP and the ACPA use nearly identical language in describing
this factor.214 Both require the registrant to attempt to divert consumers for
commercial gain 21 5 and, in the case of the ACPA, "with the intent to tarnish
Trademark Act." Id. at 535 (quoting Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316,
321 (4th Cir. 1992)).
205. Id. at 535.
206. Id.
207. Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
208. Lucent, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 535-36.
209. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V) (Supp. V 1999).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(b)(iii).
213. UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(b)(iv).
214. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V); UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(b)(iv).
215. UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(b)(iv).
2001]
134 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:1
or disparage the mark., 216 Additionally, both consider a "likelihood of
confusion" 217 as to the "source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement
' 218
of the website as a factor indicating bad faith.219  Finally, the UDRP
contains one provision the ACPA does not.220 This provision provides that
registering a domain name "primarily for the purpose of disrupting the
,,22122business of a competitor '  constitutes evidence of bad faith.222
Dispensing first with ICANN's dissimilar provision, an indicator of a
bad faith attempt to divert customers is a registrant's primary purpose to
disrupt the business of a competitor.223  A true cybergriper's primary
purpose in registering the domain name is arguably not to disrupt business,
but to voice "consumer commentary. 224 Disruption of business, if any,
would be purely incidental and not the cybergriper's primary purpose.
225
Furthermore, the cybergriper and the mark owner are hardly competitors in
the true sense of the term. 2 6 For example, in Bally, the plaintiff argued that
the defendant's website competed with the plaintiffs website because both
sites provided information about Bally's services and products.227 In
response to the plaintiffs argument, the Bally court found that the
defendant's site did not compete with Bally's site:228 "It is true that both
sites provide Internet users with the same service-information about
Bally. These sites, however, have fundamentally different purposes.
Bally's site is a commercial advertisement. Faber's site is a consumer
commentary. Having such different purposes demonstrates that these sites
are not proximately competitive. '229 Therefore, ICANN's bad faith factor
of registering the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting a
competitor's business does not apply to protest websites.230
216. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V) (Supp. V 1999).
217. Id. § 1 125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V); UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(b)(iv).
218. UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(b)(iv).
219. Id.
220. See id. § 4(b)(iii).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See id.
224. See Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
225. See id. (emphasis added).
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. But see Reg Vardy Plc v. Wilkinson, No. D2001-0593, § 5(iii) (WIPO July 3, 2001) at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-0593.html [hereinafter Reg Vardy].
[Even though the UDRP] requires that the registration of the domain names should
be primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor.., the Panel
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In addition, neither the commercial gain requirement nor the
likelihood of confusion requirement applies to the protest website model.23*
The courts in Panavision and Intermatic both implied that mere registration
of the domain names constituted commercial use because the nature of the
Internet itself satisfied the "'in commerce' requirement. '232  However,
those cases predated the ACPA and thus do not apply to the current
analysis.233 The ACPA and the UDRP both remedy this anomaly by
changing the commercial use requirement of the anti-dilution statute to
"commercial gain. 234 Since the true cybergriper does not commercially
gain anything but a forum in which to voice opinions, this language does
not apply.235
The likelihood of confusion requirement as to the "source,
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement ' 236 of the website is reminiscent of
the pre-ACPA, likelihood of confusion requirement to establish trademark
infringement or dilution.237 Compared to traditional cybersquatting cases
like Panavision, where "an individual appropriates another's registered
trademark as its domain name, 238 a reasonable consumer is not likely to be
confused as to whether the mark owner sponsors a "www. [protected
mark]sucks.com" website. 239  Accordingly, even "initial interest
confusion ' 240 does not apply to the "www.[protected mark]sucks.com"
model.24' Initial interest confusion occurs when a consumer, using a search
engine to locate a particular company or product, retrieves a list of links to
finds that the Respondent's registration of the domain names is primarily for the
purpose of disrupting the Complainant's business with the objective of causing
harm and nuisance to the Complainant, [thus constituting bad faith].
Id. (Emphasis in original). However, it is worthy of note that although the Panel found the
Respondent's website to be a protest site in the Reg Vardy case, the actual web addresses
consisted of solely the Complainant's mark, with only a hyphen added. Id. § 2. Therefore, it is
not surprising that the Panel found the requisite bad faith. See discussion infra Part III.D.2
(explaining the likelihood of confusion when domain names are used as source identifiers).
231. 15 U.S.C. § I 125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V) (Supp. V 1999); UDRP, supra note 24, §§ 4(b)(i),
4(b)(iv).
232. See id; see also Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1325; Intennatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239-40.
233. See id.
234. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V); UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(b)(iv).
235. See Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
236. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(l)(B)(i)(V).
237. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a) (1994).
238. Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1165 n.2. "In the 'cybersquatter' cases like Panavision, there
is a high likelihood of consumer confusion-reasonably prudent consumers would believe that
the site using the appropriated name is the trademark owner's official site." Id.
239. See id; see also discussion supra Part IlI.C. 1.
240. Brookfield, 174 F.3d 1036 at 1062.
241. Id.
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various websites containing keywords in the "machine readable code" 242 of
the websites matching the keywords entered in the search engine.243 For
example, a customer searching for Widgets, Inc. would enter the word
"widgets" in a search engine. Not only would the official Widgets, Inc.
website, "www.widgetsinc.com," appear on the list of "hits," but the
customer would also retrieve the "www.widgetsincsucks.com" website
because it contains the word "widgets" in the domain name and in
numerous places on the page.244 The argument that follows is that
prospective Widgets, Inc. consumers who access the protest site,
www.widgetsincsucks.com, by mistake will stop searching for Widgets,
Inc.'s home page "due to anger, frustration or the belief that [the Widgets,
Inc.] home page does not exist.
245
This argument fails for several reasons. First, the theory of initial
interest confusion does not change the fact that the cybergriper lacks the
requisite intent to divert customers.246 However, assuming arguendo that
the cybergriper possesses the intent, the use of the mark in the domain
name does not significantly add to the large list resulting from the average
Internet search, which can consist of approximately 800 to 1,000 hits.247
Second, unlike the cases of Planned Parenthood and Panavision, the
"www.[protected mark]sucks.com" model does not consist of just the
protected mark.248 Since the search engines commonly display the full
domain name of the selected sites, the word "sucks" in the domain name
communicates to web users that the site is not an authorized site for the
company.249 For example, in rejecting the defendant's assertion that the
domain name was a mere address, 250 the Panavision court found that a
customer who is unsure of a company's domain name will most likely
242. Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1165 n.3.
The machine readable code is the hidden part of the Internet upon which search
engines rely to find sites that contain content which the individual user wishes to
locate. The basic mechanics is that the web page designer places certain keywords
in an unreadable portion of the web page that tells the search engines what is on a
particular page.
Id.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1165 (quoting Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316,
1327 (9th Cir. 1998)).
246. See Lucent, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (emphasis added).
247. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327 (citing Teletech Customer Care Mgmt., Inc. v. Tele-Tech
Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (C.D. Cal. 1997)).
248. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bucci, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338 at *25
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997).
249. See Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1165.
250. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327.
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assume that the company name and domain name are one and the same.25'
Furthermore, domain names that mirror company names are valuable
because they give consumers an easy way to communicate with the
company, and vice versa.
252
However, the protest website model does not mirror the company
name to the extent where a customer would be confused.253 Instead, the
model conforms to the rationale of Panavision because
The domain name serves a dual purpose. It marks the location
of the site within cyberspace, much like a postal address in the
real world, but it may also indicate to users some information as
to the content of the site, and, in instances of well-known trade
names or trademarks, may provide information as to the origin
of the contents of the site.254
Here, the domain name, consisting of the company name with the
word "sucks" appended to it, indicates to users that the site is protesting the
protected mark and that the mark owner did not create the site.255
Finally, public policy dictates that a consumer may be entitled to
receive all the information available on a particular company.256 While the
user may choose to access the "official" company website, the search
engine results allow the customer to view uncensored consumer
commentary on the cybergriper's page.257 Thus, potential diversion exists,
but only at the consumer's election. 8
D. Bona Fide Noncommercial Use and the First Amendment
1. Domain Names Constitute Speech
In both the ACPA and the UDRP, a valid fair use defense
automatically satisfies the bona fide noncommercial use factor of the bad
251. Id. (quoting Cardservice Int'l v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 741 (E.D. Va. 1997)).
252. Id. (quoting MTV Networks, Inc. v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202, 203-04 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1994)).
253. See id.
254. Id. at 1327 n.8.
255. See Lucent, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 535 n.9.
256. See Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1165.
257. See id.
258. This is in contrast to a case such as Reg Vardy where, even though the site protested
the owner of the protected mark, consumers would likely be diverted due to the similarity of the
domain name to that protected mark. See Reg Vardy, supra note 230, § 5(i) ("[Tlhe use of the
hyphen is insufficient to distinguish the complainant's trademark[; thus] almost inevitably
members of the public are going to find the domain names confusingly similar.").
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faith test in favor of the cybergriper. Additionally, it provides a First
Amendment fair use defense to the ACPA and the UDRP as a whole. 59 In
other words, a distinction must be made between the internal fair use
defense where, by its nature, bona fide noncommercial use signifies a lack
of bad faith (and thus, "fair" use); and an external fair use defense, where
use of a trademark to exercise First Amendment speech rights will provide
a defense to an ACPA claim in general.260 While trademark law does not
trump the First Amendment right to free speech,261 it must be determined
whether domain names even constitute speech protected by the First
Amendment, and then what limitations apply, if any.
Domain names can constitute speech protected by the First
Amendment.262 The issue only becomes difficult when, as in this model,
the domain name contains both expression and functionality.263 However,
264a medium can have functionality and warrant constitutional protection.
For example, every website has an Internet protocol ("IP") number (e.g.
"156.121.20.201,,).265 Because this number is difficult to remember,
websites have a domain name to correspond to the particular IP address.266
In addition, "no two web sites should share the same internet protocol or
the same domain name., 267 The distinction between an IP address and a
domain name resembles the difference between the traditional numeric
telephone number and a mnemonic telephone number, such as "1-800-
LAW-BOOK,, 268 which a business might use to make its phone number
26more memorable to customers. 69 Similarly, vanity license plates, although
they may contain a small element of expression, serve the same function as
standard automobile license plates.270 In domain name cases, "whether the
mix of functionality and expression is 'sufficiently imbued with the
elements of communication' depends on the domain name in question, the
intentions of the registrant, the contents of the website, and the technical
protocols that govern the DNS."271
259. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(IV); UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(c)(iii).
260. See Lucent, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
261. Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *35.
262. See Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 584-85 (2d Cir. 2000).
263. Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481,484 (6th Cir. 2000).
264. Id.
265. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsch.com, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (E.D. Va. 1999).
266. Id. at 708-09.
267. Id. at 709.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Name.Space, 202 F.3d at 586.
271. Id. at 585.
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2. In the Legitimate Protest Model, Domain Names Constitute Protected
Speech
In the "[protected mark]sucks.com" model, the good-faith registrant's
intent is to protest, and the website's content will reinforce that intention.
This intent is distinguishable from other cases where, in violation of both
the confusingly similar standard and the bona fide noncommercial use
factor of the bad faith analysis, the registrant's intent is to falsely identify
the source of a product, rather than to relay a communicative message.272
This type of case does not warrant First Amendment protection because the
First Amendment does not apply to clearly deceptive or misleading
speech.273
For example, in Planned Parenthood, Bucci, a Catholic radio show
host, established the domain name "www.plannedparenthood.com. '' 274 As
an active participant in the anti-abortion movement, Bucci set up his web
page to publicize the "cost" of abortion and to make anti-abortion
propaganda available, to the public.275 The court in Planned Parenthood
found that Bucci used the domain name to mislead consumers as to the
source of the web address, rather than to relay a communicative message.276
By portraying the web page as the official Planned Parenthood home page,
he relayed his anti-abortion message to potential Planned Parenthood
clients.277  The First Amendment did not protect this use.2 78  Quoting
Yankee Publishing, Inc. v. News America Publishing, Inc., 279 the court
found that "[w]hen another's trademark.. .is used without permission for
the purpose of source identification, the trademark law generally prevails
over the First Amendment. Free speech rights do not extend to labelling
[sic] or advertising products in a manner that conflicts with the trademark
rights of others. 28 °
272. Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *35.
273. See id. at *35-*39.
274. See id. at *3.
275. Id. at *4-*7.
276. Id. at *35-*39.
277. Id. at *38-*39.
278. Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *35. "Defendant's use of
another entity's mark is entitled to First Amendment protection when his use of that mark is part
of a communicative message, not when it is used to identify the source of a product." Id. (citing
Yankee Publ'g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
279. 809 F. Supp. 267, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
280. Planned Parenthood, 1997 US. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *36-*37.
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Similarly, although the court in Name.Space, Inc. v. Network
Solutions, Inc.281 did not actually rule on the issue, in dicta it explicitly
found that domain names are not necessarily just source identifiers. 82 The
court, reluctant to hold that free speech did not protect domain names,283
stated that domain names "may be sufficiently expressive" to warrant First
Amendment protection.284
Other cases distinguish between domain names used as source
identifiers and domain names used as expression, finding that the First
Amendment does not protect misleading source identification.285  For
example, in Morrison & Foerster LLP, the defendant registered several
variations of the plaintiff's protected mark, including
"www.morrisonfoerster.com" and "www.morrisonandfoerster.com, ' '286
alleging that they were parodies of the famous law firm, Morrison &
Foerster. 287 The court found that, while the content of the sites constituted
parody protected by the First Amendment, the domain names produced
confusion.288 Since the domain names consisted of the protected mark and
nothing more, a user could only discover the defendant's attempt at parody
by reading through the content of the sites. 289  Because the defendant
deceived Internet users into thinking they were accessing Morrison &
Foerster's official website,29° the First Amendment did not protect his use
of the mark.29'
Finally, in Shields, the defendant registered common misspellings of
the plaintiff's domain name, "www.joecartoon.com.,, 292  These included
"www.joescartoon.com," "www.joecarton.com," and
281. 202 F.3d 573, 585-86 (2d Cir. 2000).
282. Id. at 584-86 (disagreeing with PGMedia, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 51 F. Supp.
2d 389, 407-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
283. Id. at 585.
284. Id. at 588.
285. See Morrison & Foerster LLP, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1134-35; Shields, 89 F. Supp. 2d at
640-41.
286. Morrison & FoersterLLP, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1127.
287. Id. at 1131. Different versions of the defendant's web pages contained such statements
as, "We're your paid friends!" and "Parasites No Soul [sic] ... No Conscience... No
Spine... NO PROBLEM!" Id. at 1128. The site also contained a letter from Morrison &
Foerster regarding trademark infringement, and several links to various other offensive sites
registered and created by the defendant. Id.
288. Id. at 1134.
289. Morrison & FoersterLLP, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1134-35.
290. Id. at 1135.
291. Id.
292. Shields, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 635.
CYBER GRIPERS FACE A CONSTITUTIONAL COLLISION
"www.joescartons.com. 2 93  The defendant attempted to assert a First
Amendment defense294 because he posted a disclaimer on his website
291
that consisted of a political objection to the "graphic and gruesome
depiction of brutality to animals in Shields's [sic] cartoons. 2 96 However,
the defendant only placed the political message on his page hours after
being served with Shields' complaint.297 Moreover, like the defendants in
Morrison & Foerster LLP 298 and Planned Parenthood,299 the defendant
tried to mislead Internet users into thinking his web page was the official
Joe Cartoon website. 300 The court, rejecting the defendant's claim of good
faith and fair use as a "spurious explanation cooked up purely for [the
lawsuit], 30 1 found it "incredible '3 °2 that the defendant had the requisite
intent for lawful political speech from the start.30 3 The court thus enjoined
this "flagrant violation ' 3° of Shields' rights.05
These cases illustrate that the First Amendment does not protect
speech when the domain name is used as a source identifier.30 6 All of these
domain names misled the Internet user into thinking that the site accessed
belonged to the trademark holder.30 7 Since the First Amendment does not
protect deceptive or misleading speech, the fair use defense did not apply in
these cases.308 Furthermore, these domain names are confusingly similar to
protected marks.30 9  The fact that these registrants relied on consumer
293. Id.
294. See id. at 640.
295. See id. at 635. The text of the political protest message read, in part:
This is a page of POLITICAL PROTEST... [a]gainst the web site
joecartoon.com. .. joecartoon.com is a web site that depicts the mutilation and
killing of animals in a shockwave based cartoon format-many children are inticed
[sic] to the web site, not knowing what is really there and then encouraged to join in
the mutilation and killing through use of the shockwave cartoon presented to them.
Id.
296. Id. at 640.
297. Id. at 648.
298. See Morrison & FoersterLLP, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1131-32.
299. See Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *30.
300. Shields, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 639-40.
301. Id. at 641.
302. Id. at 640.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 642.
305. Id.
306. See Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *34-*39; Shields, 89 F.
Supp. 2d at 639-41; Morrison & Foerster LLP, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1134-35.
307. See id.
308. See id.
309. See Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *32-*39; Shields, 89 F.
Supp. 2d at 639-40; Morrison & Foerster LLP, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1134-35.
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confusion, regardless of whether the content of their pages constituted
protected political speech, was enough to discredit any assertion of good
faith.3 10
The "www.[protected mark]sucks.com" model is a clear contrast to
these cases. The key is in the expressive content of the domain name
itself.31' Where, for example, an Internet user will likely confuse a domain
name such as "www.plannedparenthood.com" as a source identifier, the
same hardly holds true for a domain name such as
"www.lucentsucks.com.,, 312 The mere use of the word "sucks" within the
domain name expresses the registrant's view of the protected mark or the
mark holder.313 By its nature, because the website expresses this particular
view, it cannot be held to be confusingly similar to the protected mark.
314
For example, in Bally, because the use of Bally's mark was neither
confusing nor commercial, the court found that it deserved "the full breadth
of First Amendment Protection., 31 5 This external First Amendment fair
use defense thus applies to the entire ACPA and UDRP. 316 In addition, the
use of the domain name as legitimate expression satisfies the bad faith test
because it is a bona fide, noncommercial use, and thus fulfills the internal
fair use defense built into the statute.31 7 For example, the House Judiciary
Committee, quoted in Lucent, stated that § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV) was
intended to create a balance between the interests of trademark owners and
the interests of those making lawful and noncommercial fair use of the
mark.318 The mere fact that a person uses the mark lawfully indicates the
absence of bad faith.31 9
Finally, trademark owners may not stop unauthorized use of a
protected mark by a registrant, as long as that registrant is expressing a
point of view. 320 Therefore, the "www. [protected mark]sucks.com" model
310. See Shields, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 639-40.
311. See Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1167.
312. See Lucent, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
313. See Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1164. "'Sucks' has entered the vernacular as a word
loaded with criticism." Id.
314. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. wallmartcanadasucks.com, No. D2000-1104, § 4 (WIPO Nov.
23, 2000), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1104.html [hereinafter
Wal-Mart II] ("I conclude that a domain name including the word 'sucks' cannot be confusingly
similar, and that a privilege for criticism and parody reinforces that conclusion.").
315. Cisneros, supra note 1, at 242.
316. See id.
317. Lucent, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
318. Id.
319. See id.
320. Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1167.
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constitutes expression protected externally by the First Amendment as well
as internally by the bad faith factors of the statute itself, and serves as a
legitimate fair use defense.
32 1
E. ICANN Anomalies
While the Lucent case is a guideline for U.S. courts in determining the
ACPA's application to the "www.[protected mark] sucks.com" model,
ICANN has no such guideline for its arbitration cases falling under the
UDRP.32 2 Generally, the arbitrations either follow the trend of Lucent in its
application of the ACPA, or they revert back to the pre-ACPA application
of the Sleekcraft factors.323 In the National Arbitration Forum case of
CompUSA Management Co. v. Customized Computer Training,24 where
the respondent registered the domain names "www.stopcompusa.com" and
"www.bancompusa.com," the panelist found that the respondent not only
had the right to exercise his rights under the First Amendment, but the
marks and domain names were neither confusingly similar nor identical.325
Furthermore, the panelist asserted that the use of the forum in this context
was "inappropriate and constitute[d] 'cyber-bullying.'
32 6
While CompUSA followed Lucent as a guideline, other ICANN
arbitration cases have not been as consistent.327 For example, in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Walsucks,328  which involved the domain names
"www.walmartuksucks.com" and "www.walmartpuertoricosucks.com,"
among others, the panel distinguished Bally, explicitly rejected the Lucent
analysis as dicta, and went on to arbitrarily test for likelihood of confusion
by applying the Sleekcraft factors.329 While the complainant convincingly
established a bad faith attempt to profit on the part of the respondent,33 ° the
panel went further than necessary, holding the domain names were likely to
321. See Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1167; Lucent, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 535-36.
322. Steven Bonisteel, Domain Arbitrator Blows Away More "Sucks" Addresses,
NEWSBYTES, Aug. 18, 2000, at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/00/1 53868.html.
323. See generally discussion supra Part III.C. 1. (discussing Lucent and Sleekcraft).
324. No. FA0006000095082 (NAF Aug. 17, 2000), at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/
decisions/95082.htm [hereinafter CompUSA].
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. See, e.g., Steven Bonisteel, Guinness "Sucks" Domain Disputes Come to a Head,
NEWSBYTES, Aug. 28, 2000, at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/00/154332.html.
328. No. D2000-0477, § 6 (WIPO July 20, 2000), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/
decisions/html/d2000-0477 [hereinafter Wal-Mart 1].
329. See id.
330. Id.
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create confusion with the protected mark.331  This decision directly
conflicts with case law involving the same issues,332 which, by definition,
holds that the protest domain name model cannot be confusingly similar.333
Other cases, notably arbitrated by the WIPO, have followed the lead
of the Walsucks dispute.334 For example, in Diageo v. Zuccarini, the
respondent registered the variations of the domain name
"www.guinnessbeersucks.com," "www.guinnessbeerreallysucks.com,"
"www.guinnessbeerreallyreallysucks.com," and others.335 While the panel
336cocue tht"efound the requisite bad faith intent, it further concluded that "the
Respondent's domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant's
marks.
337
The panels in the various cases against Purge I.T. with respect to the
domain names "www.freeservesucks com,,,
338 "www.dixonsucks.com,,
339
and "www.standardcharteredsucks.com," 340  also reached the same
conclusion as in Diageo.34' The panel concluded, after examination of the
domain name in Freeserve, that the adoption of the complainant's name
within the domain name "is inherently likely to lead some people to believe
that the Complainant is connected with it."' 342 It found that, while some
Internet users would disassociate the additional "sucks" from the
complainant's mark, "others may be unable to give it any very definite
meaning and will be confused about the potential association with the
Complainant., 343  This reasoning completely contradicts the First
331. See id.
332. See Bonisteel, supra note 327.
333. See, e.g., Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1163-64.
334. See Diageo plc v. Zuccarini, No. D2000-0996 (WIPO Oct. 22, 2000), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2000-0996.html [hereinafter Diageo]; Standard
Chartered plc v. Purge I.T., No. D2000-0681 (WIPO Aug. 13, 2000), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/
domains/decisions/html/d2000-0681.html [hereinafter Standard Chartered]; Freeserve plc v.
Purge I.T., No. D2000-0585 (WIPO Aug. 13, 2000), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
htmI/d2000-0585.html [hereinafter Freeserve]; Dixons Group plc v. Purge I.T., No. D2000-0584
(WIPO Aug. 13, 2000), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2000-0584.html
[hereinafter Dixons Group].
335. Diageo, supra note 334, § 2.
336. Diageo, supra note 334, § 5. The respondent not only registered many variations of
this particular domain name, but he was also the defendant in Shields. 89 F. Supp. 2d at 635.
337. Diageo, supra note 334, § 7.
338. Freeserve, supra note 334, § 1.
339. Dixons Group, supra note 334, § 1.
340. Standard Chartered, supra note 334, § 1.
341. See Diageo, supra note 334, § 7; Standard Chartered, supra note 334, § 6; Freeserve,
supra note 334, § 6; Dixons Group, supra note 334, § 6.
342. Freeserve, supra note 334, § 5.
343. Id.
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Amendment (external) fair use defense to the ACPA. 344 While these
respondents arguably register the domain names in bad faith, through the
balancing of various other factors, the WIPO panel arbitrarily and
incorrectly went too far in finding the domain names confusingly similar
345
to the marks.346 The panel further added that, in many of these cases, its
logic is not conclusive regarding other instances of "-sucks" domain names,
stating:
An application of the Sleekcraf! factors in another context
involving Complainant's mark and the word "sucks" might
produce a different result than that reached here. The Panel
notes that use of a domain name confusingly similar to a mark
may be justified by fair use or legitimate noncommercial use
considerations, and that this may in other cases permit the use of
"-sucks" formative names in free expression forums.3 4 7
However, the panel's decision does not leave much room for error in
cases involving the legitimate "www.[protected mark]sucks.com" model.348
The WIPO implies that, while the mark is confusingly similar, it may be
"justified by fair use or legitimate noncommercial use considerations." 349 It
is impossible to reconcile this logic with an ACPA analysis, which
provides that the registrant cannot assert a successful First Amendment
defense if a domain name is confusingly similar to the protected mark
because the domain name appears as a source identifier rather than a means
of expression.350  The very nature of the "www. [protected
mark]sucks.com" model keeps it from the "confusingly similar" 351
category. 2  Furthermore, finding a "www.[protected mark]sucks.com"
website confusingly similar to a protected mark in essence satisfies the
UDRP's bad faith requirement.353 Therefore, this implied loophole is a
legal fiction - as long as the WIPO panels continue to view these domain
names as confusingly similar to the protected marks, a legitimate protest
344. See Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1167.
345. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (Supp. V 1999).
346. See Diageo, supra note 334, § 7; Standard Chartered, supra note 334, § 6; Freeserve,
supra note 334, § 6; Dixons Group, supra note 334, § 6.
347. Wal-Mart I, supra note 328, § 6.
348. See id.
349. Id. § 6 (emphasis added).
350. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *36-*38.
351. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(l)(A)(ii)(I) (Supp. V 1999).
352. See, e.g., Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1163-64 ("No reasonable consumer comparing
Bally's official web site with Faber's site would assume Faber's site 'to come from the same
source, or thought to be affiliated with, connected with, or sponsored by, the trademark owner.').
353. See UDRP, supra note 24, § 4(b).
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domain name registrant will never be able to assert First Amendment rights
in the "www. [protected mark]sucks.com" model.354
IV. AN IDEAL COMPROMISE
A. Comparison of lCANNArbitration and the U.S. Court System
Even though ACPA litigation in traditional courts is preferable where
a trademark holder needs the immediate relief of a temporary restraining
order, when the trademark owner seeks damages, or when it is clear that the
registrant will fight to the "bitter end," ICANN arbitration has its
advantages.355  For example, arbitration is generally faster and less
expensive than going to court.356 ICANN's arbitration panels usually
render decisions within two months, and the costs are fixed.357 In addition,
attorneys' fees in arbitration are reasonable because of the limited duration
of the actual proceedings.358
However, the appeal of ICANN arbitration is outweighed by its
shortcomings, especially concerning the registrant of the "www. [protected
mark]sucks.com" model. An arbitration decision may have evidentiary
value in a subsequent court proceeding, either where the registrant tries to
prove a bad-faith use of the arbitration system by the trademark-holder or
where the trademark-holder asserts damages against the domain name
registrant.359  Yet, ICANN arbitration proceedings have no legal
precedential value. In a case of first impression, the court in Weber-
Stephen Products Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Building Supply, Inc36°
held that "this Court is not bound by the outcome of the ICANN
administrative proceedings., 361 The court further declined to determine a
standard of review for the panel's decision, and what deference, if any, it
would give that decision.362
354. But see Wal-Mart II, supra note 314, § 6(D) (reasoning that, "I do not see how a
domain name including 'sucks' ever can be confusingly similar to a trademark to which 'sucks' is
appended").
355. Railo, supra note 86, at 6.
356. Null, supra note 30, at 42.
357. Gitchel, supra note 94, at 34.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 34-35.
360. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6335, at *6 (ND. Il. May 3, 2000).
361. Id. at *7.
362. Id.
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Moreover, ICANN arbitration decisions have little precedential value
within the family of ICANN's own arbitration panels.363  Although
arbitrators often rely on other decisions within their own particular forum
as precedent, nothing in the UDRP requires them to do so.364 This, in turn,
leads to a seemingly ad hoc decision-making process that will not stand in
federal court.
365
In addition, critics of ICANN have asserted bias in the arbitration
proceedings given that three out of four cases are decided in favor of
corporations.366 Furthermore, while the complainant in the NAF and the
WIPO wins more than eighty percent of the time, eResolutions proceedings
only find for the complainant roughly fifty percent of the time.367 In a
detailed study, Dr. Milton Mueller found that while price differences,
decision turnaround, and country of origin played a part in forum selection,
decision outcome was the strongest of the factors.368 In other words, the
complainant has the choice of forum. Thus, the complainant is most likely
to choose the forum that has a statistically higher number of outcomes in
favor of the complainant. 369 This leads to forum shopping and, arguably,
an abuse of the arbitration system.
An additional impact on the fairness of ICANN's procedure is the use
of the WIPO as an arbitration forum.370 The WIPO has the highest history
of winning complainants. 371 However, the WIPO's participation in the
arbitration proceedings also constitutes a conflict of interest.37 The WIPO
is a division of the United Nations, organized to "promote the protection of
intellectual property. 37 3  As part of this mandate, the WIPO, for a fee,
helps companies file international patents and trademarks.374 The proceeds
for its international filing assistance amounts to eighty-five percent of the
WIPO budget, which equaled around two hundred million dollars for
363. Hartje, supra note 14, at 39.
364. Id.
365. See id.
366. Elizabeth Wasserman, The New Masters of Domains, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Sept. 4,
2000, LEXIS, News.
367. Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: An Analysis of ICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy, at http://dcc.syr.edu/roughjustice.htm (November 2000).
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. See id.
371. Id.
372. See Wasserman, supra note 366.
373. Id.
374. Id.
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2000-2001. 375  While the arbitrators may try to adjudicate these cases
fairly, it is difficult to see how bias would not interfere in light of such a
376ane adsignificant financial interest for the organization. Therefore, a new and
fairer procedure is necessary to decide the UDRP cases.
B. International Implications of the Protest Model
The Internet is an international medium. While jurisdiction and
choice of law issues are beyond the scope of this Comment, it is worth
noting that many other countries do not have the equivalent of the First
Amendment of the Consitution of the United States.37 7 In addition,
trademark laws may differ from country to country. 378  Therefore, it
logically flows that the UDRP may either expand or restrict a particular
individual's rights, depending on the individual's country of origin.379
In addition, the issue of native language presents a sticky situation.
For example, the panel in Caixa d'Estalvis y Pensions de Barcelona ("La
Caixa ") v. Namezero.com 38  awarded the domain name
"www.lakaixa.com" to the complainant after determining that the
Respondent's "cultural criticism" of the complainant in substituting the
letter "c" with the letter "k" would not be understood "outside of certain
Latin countries ... of a specific countercultural milieu."38' The panel went
further to differentiate La Caixa from the American "-sucks.com" cases by
following the precedent set in the French case, Societe Accor v.
375. Id.
376. See ICANN Watch: Comments on WIP02 due Friday, at http://www.icannwatch.org/
article.php?sid= 192 (posted June 4, 2001).
Since complainants choose the arbitral body, the current system creates a financial
incentive for arbitral bodies to compete to be "complainant friendly".... This
reasonable suspicion of partiality, whether or not it actually exists, provides a
reason why the impartiality of the arbitral bodies might reasonably be questioned;
as such it taints the entire system.
Id.
377. See, e.g., Societe Accor v. M. Philippe Hartmann, No. D2001-0007, §§ 6, 6(A) (WIPO
Mar. 13, 2001), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2001-0007.html [hereinafter
Societe Accor]. The Commission claimed it was not competent to address freedom of expression
over the Internet. Id. § 6. Moreover, it noted that under French law, parody can result in civil
liability of the user. Id. § 6(A).
378. Misha Gregory Macaw, Note, The New Rum War: Havana Club as a Threat to the U.S.
Interest in International Trademark Harmonization, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 291, 322 (2000).
379. See id.
380. No. D2001-0360 (WIPO May 3, 2001), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
html/200l/d2001-0360.html [hereinafter La Caixa].
381. Id. § 6(C). "[I1n several Latin languages, it has become common to substitute the letter
'k' to the letter 'c' in order to express a left-wing or anarchist protest." Id.
CYBERGRIPERS FACE A CONSTITUTIONAL COLLISION
Hartmann.382 The panel in Societe Accor noted, in awarding the domain
name "accorsucks.com" to the complainant, that "it is not obvious, given
the international character of the Internet, that everybody, in every country
of the world, would immediately recognize what 'sucks' means. 383 Thus,
in comparing the two, the La Caixa panel found that, while converting "c"s
into "k"s as a form of expression resembles the use of the word "sucks" in
English, that practice is exclusive to Latin countercultures. 384 Most Internet
users would not understand the reference. 385 Rather, the Internet public
would view "LAKAIXA" as a mark confusingly similar to Complainant's
trademark, "LA CAIXA.' 386 "The countercultural meaning of political
criticism would have been understood only by a minority.,
387
While this decision seems to be an anomaly, more of these types of
cases will arise with increased international use of the Internet and the
increasing number of domain names available with new gTLDs.388  It
remains to be seen what impact this will have on international arbitration.
C. Potential Solutions
Fairness and consistency are the touchstones in applying the ACPA
and the UDRP to legitimate protest websites. The focus needs to shift from
a contest between the domain name and trademark holders to adequate
representation of the interests of both corporate and individual Internet
users.389 While application of the ACPA in federal courts may arguably
lead to "divergent judicial enforcement" 390 because of the potential
inconsistency in applying the bad faith factor balancing test,391 the ACPA's
application in practice has led to more congruous results than ICANN's
UDRP.392
Additionally, a recent ICANN development has led to even more
potential legal issues.393 In November 2000, ICANN selected seven new
382. Societe Accor, supra note 377.
383. La Caixa, supra note 380, § 6(C); see also Societe Accor, supra note 377.
384. La Caixa, supra note 380, § 6(C).
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
389. Walker, supra note 81, at 303-04.
390. See Dartley, supra note 33.
391. See id.
392. See discussion supra Part III.E. (highlighting ICANN anomalies as compared to the
ACPA process).
393. See, e.g., ICANN Press Release: ICANN Announces Selections for New Top-Level
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gTLDs for further negotiation, including ".biz," ".info" and ".name."
394
Out of fear of the potential increase of domain name/trademark disputes,
ICANN's Intellectual Property Constituency proposed a "sunrise" period
that would allow trademark owners to preemptively register variations of
their trademarks as domain names before ICANN allows public access.395
This policy would allow trademark holders, in violation of ICANN's own
bad-faith test, to engage in a form of reverse-cybersquatting by simply
registering these domain names in order to prevent others from using
them.396
ICANN's Non-Commercial Domain Name Holders Constituency
("NCDNHC") takes a different position.397 It presented several resolutions
to the ICANN Board during its quarterly international meeting, including
"Resolution #5," which strongly opposes these "sunrise" arrangements as
they unfairly give trademark holders priority over others who may have a
legitimate use of the name. 398  The NCDNHC additionally passed a
resolution to reopen applications for new TLDs that support free
expression, noting that none of the new TLDs explicitly "support these
values. 399 Finally, the NCDNHC recommended a task force to provide
guidelines for the UDRP process, including the request that the
complainant in the UDRP proceeding should not have the exclusive
opportunity to choose the arbitration forum.400 While these resolutions
have yet to be adopted by ICANN, they serve as another step towards
recognizing and resolving these issues.40 1
In addition to the First Amendment, public policy requires consumers
to be allowed to express their views, even if that cannot occur without
stepping on the toes of large corporations.40 2 Further, a company can even
Domains, at http://www.icann.org/announcements/icann-prl6novOO.htm (last updated Nov. 16,
2000) [hereinafter ICANN Press Release].
394. Id.
395. Oscar S. Cisneros, TLDs Need Some TLC, at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/
0,1283,40202,00.html (Nov. 15, 2000).
396. See Leibowitz, supra note 12.
397. See Resolution #5, at http://www.ncdnhc.org/docs/resolution/resolution5.html (adopted
Nov. 13, 2000).
398. Id.
399. Resolution #7, at http://www.ncdnhc.org/docs/resolution/resolution7.html (adopted
Nov. 13, 2000). ICANN denied this resolution. See ICANN Press Release, supra note 393
(announcing the list of gTLD applications selected for negotiation).
400. Resolution #2, at http://www.ncdnhc.org/docs/resolution/resolution2.html (adopted
Nov. 13, 2000).
401. See, e.g., Railo, supra note 86.
402. See, e.g., Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (E.D. Penn.
2000).
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turn these Internet attacks to its advantage.4 °3 For example, newsgroup
comments attacking Timberland Co.'s racially discriminating practice of
not serving minority neighborhoods promptly encouraged the shoe
company to join the discussion in order to disprove allegations and rebuild
its reputation.4 °4 In addition, disgruntled schoolteacher David Felton
created a protest site relating to Dunkin' Donuts when he could not find his
favorite coffee lightener at any of his local franchises. 405  His "cyber-
bulletin board" soon became a "hotbed of doughnut discontent," 0 6 and is
now frequently monitored by executives at Dunkin' Donuts'
headquarters.40 7 The company uses the bulletin board in a valiant customer
service effort, sending free coupons to disgruntled customers, and even
makes sure Felton's local franchise contains plenty of one-percent milk.40 8
This lighthearted example barely touches on the legal and
constitutional implications of not having a consistent method for resolving
these disputes. As the ACPA cases usually involve a preliminary
injunction with no jury present, and as the ICANN Board and arbitrators
can hardly claim to be representative of the people subject to their rulings,
many scholars have suggested the use of juries, particularly in ICANN
proceedings, to decide the non-legal issues of reasonableness and bad
faith.409 While this suggestion raises many other issues, such as how the
UDRP juries should be chosen and how to find an appropriate pool of
jurors, it is a step in the right direction.410
The problem with the "www. [protected mark]sucks.com" model is
the inapplicability of existing law to Internet law cases.4 1' It is a matter of
trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. Lawmakers, courts, and
arbitration forums alike need to invent new ways to deal with these
emerging issues. An international, unbiased forum is necessary, perhaps
complete with a jury, in which to try these cases. Furthermore, these
decisions should have significant precedential value, as well as finality in
federal courts.
403. Leibowitz, supra note 12.
404. ld.
405. Sites for Sore Consumers, supra note 18.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. See id.
409. See David G. Post, Why Juries Should Play a Role in the Institutions that Govern
Cyberspace-Part 11, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20001030-post.html (last
visited Nov. 20, 2000).
410. Id.
411. See Parody Sites, supra note 1.
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V. CONCLUSION
Although our Disgruntled Customer has a legitimate protest site that
will probably fall under First Amendment protection in court, his
cybergripe against Widgets, Inc. will most likely fail if Widgets, Inc.
pursues the claim through ICANN's UDRP. Since the mere registration of
the domain name makes ICANN arbitration mandatory, the Corporate
Giant will most likely win its case by convincing the arbitration panel that
the domain name is confusingly similar to its protected mark. A fair use
defense will probably fail because the finding that the domain name is
confusingly similar implies bad faith in that the average Internet user would
mistake the domain as the Corporate Giant's official website. Thus, this
renders the domain name a source identifier rather than a means of
expression, thereby diverting customers and discounting bona fide
noncommercial use.
However, under the ACPA, Disgruntled Customer will be able to
prove his good faith by his bona fide noncommercial use of the domain
name to protest the Corporate Giant. Additionally, his First Amendment
defense of fair use establishes his protest site as a means of expression, as
compared to a source identifier. Thus, because the domain name is not
confusingly similar, Disgruntled Customer has a fair use defense to the
ACPA as a whole, which at the same time, may counterbalance any
indication of bad faith.
Applying existing law to the "Information Superhighway" creates an
awesome challenge. Recent decisions pave the way at breakneck speed,
often leaving domain name disputes in the dust. A fair and consistent
system needs to exist for the benefit of trademark owners and protesters
alike-one designed to protect both trademark and First Amendment rights.
All parties involved must address this issue today. Otherwise, the road to
resolution will indefinitely remain under construction.
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